Federal Reserve : An anchor of gold : how the gold standard works in theory and practice by Stephen Slivinski
S
ome modern critics of the
Federal Reserve suggest that it
could be eliminated and replaced
with a gold standard. They claim that
monetary policymakers are apt to
bend under pressure to inflate the
currency. A gold standard, on the
other hand, can serve as an anchor for
the currency that puts a limit on the
growth rate of the money supply.
There are benefits to a gold stan-
dard, but there are costs too. The
history of the gold standard provides
important context for the suggestion
that the United States should return 
to a commodity-backed monetary 
system — gold historically being 
the most commonly used commodity.
Additionally, policymakers and the
public could benefit from a greater
understanding of how the gold stan-
dard works, even if reforms of the
monetary system do not include its
restoration.
Mechanics of a Gold Standard
In the United States, the gold standard
operated for most of the 18th century
and the early 20th century before the
creation of the Fed. (See sidebar). 
In the absence of a central bank,
nations that committed to the gold
standard agreed to redeem their 
currency at a fixed price of gold. The
gold standard effectively fixed
exchange rates between participating
nations since those currencies were
themselves fixed to gold. When
the stock of gold is relatively fixed,
this arrangement can provide a 
predictability that currencies not
anchored by a commodity standard
may fail to produce. The supply of
money is constrained by the amount
of gold in the vaults of each nation. 
By contrast, fiat money created by
central banks and not backed by a
commodity in relatively fixed supply
could be devalued simply by printing
more of it.
That doesn’t mean that prices
wouldn’t change under a gold stan-
dard. In practice, the price level of
nations would tend to move in tandem
under this arrangement. The mecha-
nism that drives the movement in the
price level is the balance of payments
that results from trade between
nations. For example, assume that a
technological innovation increases
economic growth in the United States.
Since the supply of gold, and therefore
the money stock, is fixed, prices in the
United States will fall since it is cheap-
er to produce goods domestically as a
result of the innovation. Prices of U.S.
exports to other countries would fall
too. That leads to lower demand for
U.S. imports — which are now rela-
tively more expensive — and increased
demand for U.S. products
abroad. 
Under a gold standard, the
currency and the commodity by
which it is backed travel togeth-
er. In the example above, the
trade surplus would also result in
a balance-of-payments surplus in
which gold from overseas would
find its way into the coffers of
U.S. banks as foreign traders use
dollars to purchase U.S. goods. 
The stabilizing effect of the
gold standard manifests itself
here in how prices would react to
this surplus. The new gold in the
United States will reverse the 
initial price decline. Meanwhile, the
exodus of gold from abroad will lower
the price level in the countries that
traded with the United States since
smaller amounts of gold equal 
a shrinking of the money supply.
Equilibrium is reached when the rela-
tive prices between nations converge.  
Weighing the Costs and Benefits
While anchoring the money supply to
gold may have obvious benefits, there
are risks to consider. One potential
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Kdownside is the effect that a discovery of large amounts of
gold would have on the price level. This was a problem in the
late 1840s when the California gold rush introduced large
amounts of gold into circulation, causing a “monetary
shock” and a rise in the price level of goods. In addition,
mining and minting gold is costly. Economist Milton
Friedman once estimated that the resource price of produc-
ing gold and maintaining a full gold coin standard for the
United States would be more than 2.5 percent of GDP.
However, that cost could fall over time as new technologies
are developed.
Some believe that gold flows between nations serve as a
check on inflation. Tame inflation over the long term was a
strong characteristic of the gold standard. Yet gold flows
could transmit detrimental shocks, both monetary and non-
monetary, between economies. In the past, vulnerability to
economic shocks caused prices to be highly unstable in the
short run. Economist Michael Bordo of Rutgers estimated
the “coefficient of variation” in the price level under the 
historical gold standard. Ahigher coefficient indicates more
short-term instability. For the United States between 1879
and 1913, the coefficient was 17, which Bordo notes is quite
high. Between 1946 and 1990, when central banks were able
to deviate from the automatic responses required by the
gold standard, it was only 0.88. By association, real output is
also highly variable under a gold standard. The coefficient
for variation was 3.5 between 1879 and 1913. But between
1946 and 2003 it was only 0.4. 
Central banks would later mitigate the costs of 
economic shocks by pursuing countercyclical policies. Yet a
gold standard, by definition, makes the money supply 
procyclical — when the economy contracts, so does the
money supply. For supporters, this is a benefit: It can limit
the potentially expansionary impulses of central bankers.
Supporters also point out that the system can work without
a central bank officiating the movement of gold. Instead,
each government must make a credible commitment to
allow currency holders to redeem their bills for a predeter-
mined amount of gold. One way to do this is to pass a law
that fixes the exchange rate between gold and the currency.
In the United States, the Gold Standard Act of 1900 set the
price of one ounce of gold at $20.67. However, keeping such
credible commitments may prove difficult in the wake of
unexpected shocks and geopolitical upheaval.
Central Banks and the Gold Standard 
Much of the 20th century featured a mixed system in which
central banks and the gold standard existed simultaneously.
The ideal role of central banks when an international gold
standard is in force is to sustain the fixed exchange rates 
and allow prices and output to vary as required by the 
movement of gold across borders. When gold is flowing into
the country, for instance, the central bank should raise 
the interest rate at which it lends to banks — the discount
rate — to facilitate the inflow. Conversely, the central bank
should lower the discount rate to facilitate the gold outflow
when a balance-of-payments deficit materializes.
However, there can be temptations for central banks to
stop playing by the rules. Monetary policymakers could
“sterilize” the gold flow: They could buy or sell domestic
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Between the nation’s founding and 1971, the United States
had been on one form or another of a gold standard. The
authors of the Constitution were of the opinion that any
money minted by the federal governments should be backed
by some “specie” standard (i.e., gold or silver).
On the recommendation of Secretary of State Alexander
Hamilton, the U.S. Congress passed the Coinage Act of 1792.
That officially put the United States on a bimetallic stan-
dard in which the dollar was defined as equaling a specified
weight in gold or silver. However, the ratio between gold and
silver that the act established — 15 grains of silver to 1 grain
of gold — served to undervalue gold relative to silver after
the act was passed. This was particularly true over the next
three decades as mines in Mexico yielded more silver. As a
result, gold began to flow out of the United States and silver
began to flow in. While gold and silver coins were still
accepted as legal tender, gold coins became quite scarce. 
The Coinage Act of 1834 put the United States on a 
de jure gold standard. It moved the ratio of silver to gold to
16-to-1. That helped remedy the imbalance, and gold coins
became more common in the United States. 
Before the Civil War, state-chartered banks could issue
notes and certificates that were redeemable in specie.
During the war, a partly decentralized national banking 
system existed in which federally chartered banks would
deal in “greenbacks” issued by the U.S. government backed
by little specie. The return to an operational gold standard
occurred in 1879 when the U.S. government resumed 
payments of gold to dollar holders who demanded them. 
By that point, however, a series of Supreme Court decisions
had made the greenbacks legal tender, which over time
crowded out state-issued currency.
The United States tied itself to a de facto monometallic
standard with the Gold Standard Act of 1900. It set the 
dollar price of gold at $20.67 per ounce, effectively relegating
silver to a subsidiary role in the monetary system. This meant
that dollars would circulate alongside silver coins, and the
U.S. Treasury would aim to sustain the dollar price of gold. 
The creation of the Federal Reserve in 1913 took away
from the executive branch the explicit power of money
stock maintenance. The history of the 20th century would
show, however, that the relationship between a gold 
standard and the central bank was an uneasy one.
— STEPHEN SLIVINSKI
The U.S. Gold Standard Before the Fed
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securities — in other words, either expand or contract the
money supply relative to gold — to shield the domestic
money supply from the external disequilibrium. This would
weaken the ability of the gold standard to anchor the value
of money in the economy. 
Economic downturns, political pressures, and wartime
threatened the gold standard in the 20th century. Just as it
was at the peak of its effectiveness in 1914, World War I
broke out. Britain, the banking center of Europe, experi-
enced a run on sterling and enacted trade and exchange
controls, including a postponement of domestic and inter-
national payments. This basically made the international
gold standard nonoperational. Other countries instituted
similar capital controls. In addition, the issuance of short-
term debt to finance the war effort in the United States led
the federal government to pressure the Fed to abandon the
gold standard rules on exchange rate targets and instead
focus on keeping the interest rates on war bonds low. 
After the war, the developed nations tried to reconstruct
the gold standard. The 1917 U.S. embargo on gold exports
was lifted in 1919, and the convertibility of the dollar at the
prewar gold price was restored in 1922. The gold value of the
dollar rather than the pound sterling soon became the refer-
ence point for other currencies. The post-war gold standard
was faced with new challenges, though. High tariff barriers
during the 1920s hindered the price adjustment process.
Also, the United States, France, and England began routine
sterilization of gold flows. 
The economic pressures of the Great Depression weak-
ened support for the gold standard. Britain left the standard
in 1931 after a massive gold outflow. The United States 
followed in 1933 when emergency measures allowed the
federal government to abrogate all gold-related clauses in all
public and private contracts. In 1934 it devalued the dollar
by raising the fixed price for gold to $35 per ounce.
Emergency measures also allowed the issuance of Federal
Reserve notes that did not have to be backed by gold. World
War II drove central banks even further away from the gold
standard as they again sought to keep government borrow-
ing costs low at the expense of the fixed exchange rate. Trade
and capital restrictions also hindered whatever cross-border
price adjustment might have occurred. 
After the war, the finance ministers and treasury secre-
taries of the Allied nations met in Bretton Woods, N.H., to
reconstruct some form of a gold standard. The agreement
essentially linked the dollar to gold and, in turn, all other
major currencies were linked to the dollar. Yet it also allowed
some flexibility for central banks to pursue changes in the
exchange rate. Foreign governments were also allowed to
trade in their dollars to the U.S. government in return for
gold. The expectation was that the United States could cred-
ibly commit to maintaining the standard over the long term.
In the early 1950s, the United States held close to 60 per-
cent of the world’s gold reserves. By the 1960s, however,
dollars began to rapidly flow out of the United States as a
result of the Fed monetizing the debt issued to pay for
spending on the Great Society social programs and the
Vietnam War. The inflationary policies of the United States
put pressure on currencies that were linked to the dollar to
revalue their currency to satisfy the balance of payments —
pressure that reached its peak in 1970. Additionally, U.S. gold
reserves were beginning to dwindle because foreign govern-
ments were rapidly trading in their dollars for gold. Many
foreign policymakers were not convinced that the U.S. 
government would regain a commitment to exchange rates
per the Bretton Woods rules in the near term. To put an end
to the international pressure, President Richard Nixon
finally took the dollar off gold in 1971, effectively killing the 
international gold standard. 
Gold and Monetary Policy Today
Since the episode of runaway inflation in the 1970s, 
monetary economists have learned a number of lessons.
Foremost among them is an understanding of how central
bank credibility is vital to monetary policy. In some sense,
that is also a lesson of the gold standard years. Regardless of
the signals central bankers use to navigate policy, public
trust that they will stay the course is essential to making the
policy work. Even under a gold standard, the stability pro-
vided by the commodity anchor dissolves if the central bank
can’t or won’t credibly commit to the rules of the standard.
Today, the price of gold is just one of a number of 
signals that Fed policymakers may use to make decisions
about the direction of monetary policy. Since the 1980s, 
the Fed’s independence and need to maintain its credibility 
have largely been helpful in keeping inflation under 
control even when it has to occasionally embark upon 
countercyclical policy. Many of the traits that supporters 
of the gold standard value, such as long-term price stability,
have materialized over the past 20 years under a fiat money
system not directly tethered to the price of gold. 
It’s unlikely that the nations of the world will adopt the
gold standard again. But the lessons of central bank credi-
bility are a product of the gold standard years. Strong public
expectations about how the Fed conducts policy may produce
the same benefits today that a gold standard once did.  RF
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